










The Gas Target Model in Central 







•	 A	V4	level	 implementation	would	benefit	 from	current	interconnec-
tion	plans	and	allow	improved	competition	and	liquidity,	and	a	better	
exploitation	of	new	market	opportunities.
•	 Joint	V4	 implementation	proposals	would	be	more	 likely	 to	succeed	
if	in	line	with	private	development	interests	and	with	other	initiatives	
undertaken	in	the	wider	Central	and	Eastern	Europe.
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supplies	 under	 long	 term,	 oil	 linked	 contracts;	 limited	 inter-
connection	 (except	 between	 Czech	 Republic	 and	 Slovakia);	
overwhelming	 East-West	 flows;	 limited,	 though	 growing,	




Because	of	 these	 facts,	V4	 countries	have	 long	 suffered	 from	
low	security	of	supply	standards.
The	 similarity	 of	 issues	 and	 geographical	 proximity	 have	 led	
the	V4	countries	to	undertake	closer	collaboration,	notably	by	
agreeing	on	a	 common	 security	of	 supply	 strategy,	 including	
regional	emergency	planning.	It	is	not	surprising	that	they	have	




pean	market,	 thanks	 to	 larger	 interconnection	endowed	with	
firm	reverse	flow	capacity;	whereas	Hungary	has	several	inter-













reviews	 has	 kept	 spot	 prices	 in	 the	 most	 advanced	 markets	
below	those	of	V4	countries.	
The	 implementation	of	 the	European	Network	Codes	 and	of	
the	 recently	 adopted	EU	Congestion	Management	 rules	may	
further	open	up	pipeline	capacity	with	Turkey	and	Greece,	in	
the	same	way	as	it	has	recently	happened	for	interconnections	
between	 V4	 countries	 and	 their	Western	 neighbours,	 which	
have	become	partly	 available	 for	 (physical	or	virtual)	 reverse	
flow	services.	More	generally,	ENCs	will	require	a	major	review	
of	market	regulation,	which	represents	an	opportunity	for	har-














Hence,	 the	 V4	 decision	 to	 cooperate	 for	 the	 exploitation	 of	
these	opportunities	is	clearly	justified.	The	GTM	studies	have	
noticed	 that	 investments	 aimed	at	 a	 certain	market	 areas	 are	
boosted	by	the	availability	of	a	liquid	and	reasonably	competi-
tive	market.	 In	 turn	 this	 requires	a	market	 size	of	 at	 least	20	
Bcm/year	and	the	availability	of	at	least	three	different	sources,	
with	 a	 reasonably	 low	 market	 concentration	 (with	 an	 HHI	
index	around	2000)2.	None	of	the	V4	countries	can	individu-
ally	achieve	any	of	these	conditions	at	present:	only	Poland	may	
have	 such	 capacity	 in	 coming	 years,	 although	 through	 LNG	
supplies	that	may	be	rather	costly	in	the	short	term	and	a	very	
dramatic	 fall	 of	 the	 incumbent’s	 market	 share,	 which	 could	





the	achievement	of	 at	 least	 two	 such	conditions	 (market	 size	
and	concentration)	and	help	achieving	 the	 third	one	by	 trig-
gering	investment	in	new	supplies	and	connections.	
Principles of an enhanced V4 collaboration
The	political	 proposals	 for	 a	 joint	V4	 implementation	 of	 the	
GTM	calls	 for	 the	establishment	of	a	virtual	 trading	point	 in	
the	region,	supported	by	a	single	balancing	zone,	and	with	an	
energy	 exchange	 for	 gas	 trading.	 Harmonised	 transmission	
products	would	 ensure	 gas	 flows	 throughout	 the	 region	 and	
across	it.
It	 is	 suggested	 that	 the	 implementation	of	 these	cornerstones	
should	be	consistent	with	three	policy	principles:
1.	 	 	 Any	market	 design	 should	 be	 implemented	 consistently	
with	 market	 opportunities,	 possibly	 by	 means	 of	 policy	
instruments	that	are	suitable	to	foster	the	smoothest	con-
vergence	 of	 business	 and	 political	 decisions	 (including	
2.	 Jean-Michel	Glachant,	“A	Vision	for	the	EU	Target	Model:	the	MECO-S	
Model”,	 EUI	 Working	 Paper	 RSCAS	 2011/38;	 http://fsr.eui.eu/
Publications/WORKINGPAPERS/Energy/2011/WP201138.aspx
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taxes,	subsidies	and	action	by	government-owned	compa-
nies).	 In	other	words,	 the	objectives	of	V4	 collaboration	
should	be	fully	consistent	with	business	interests	and	com-
panies’	strategies	rather	than	against	them;
2.	 	 Existing	 cooperation	 projects	 extending	 beyond	 the	 V4	
region	should	be	encompassed	 in	 the	region	rather	 than	
substituted	 for,	 notably	 if	 these	 involve	 the	 integration	
with	more	advanced	and	competitive	markets;
3.				A	process	-	rather	than	an	abstract	market	design	-	should	







Initiative	 is	articulated	(GRI	SSE:	 it	also	comprises	 Italy,	Slo-
venia,	 Austria,	 Romania,	 Bulgaria,	 Cyprus	 and	Greece).	The	
V4	countries	have	important	interconnections	with	other	SSE	
countries,	 in	particular	with	Austria	and	Romania,	as	well	as	












Applicable high level design models
The	 integration	of	V4	countries	may	 start	 from	several	basic	
models.	Some	of	them	can	also	be	combined	or	modified,	so	
that	 they	 become	 different	 development	 stages	 of	 the	 same	
process	 rather	 than	 alternative	 solutions.	 Their	 feasibility	 is	
related	to	infrastructure	development	in	various	ways	that	are	
discussed	in	the	Report.	




GTM	objective	 of	 having	 access	 to	 al	 least	 three	 different	







tion	 and	 a	 single	market	 operator.	This	 solution	 does	 not	
necessarily	 require	 the	 full	merger	 of	TSOs,	 but	 at	 least	 a	
very	close	cooperation	and	probably	the	establishment	of	a	












•	 Multiple coupled market zones.	 Several	 zones	 with	 for-
mally	working	 spot	markets,	 though	not	 very	 liquid,	may	
be	connected	through	market	coupling	once	they	are	inter-












advice	 about	 the	 feasibility	 and	 condition	 of	market	 cou-
pling.
•	 Independent connection to more liquid zones.	 This	 solu-
tion	avoids	any	proposal	of	active	market	integration,	with	
the	 exception	of	 those	necessary	 to	 ensure	 the	 security	 of	
supply	 standards	 required	 by	 Regulation	 994/2010/EC.	
This	 approach	 considers	 that	markets	 can	 in	 fact	 be	 inte-
grated,	with	 substantial	 price	 alignment,	 by	market	 forces	
that	select	one	or	more	favourite	trading	spots,	which	act	as	
benchmarks	for	other	market	zones.	This	happens	if	all	con-
nected	zones	can	“shop”	 in	 that	market,	even	with	 limited	










Proposals for joint GTM V4 implementa-









i.   Establishment of working connection among the V4 and 
with neighbouring countries.	 NRAs	 and	 TSOs	 should	
work	 to	ensure	 that	market	 rules	and	procedures	ensure	
the	smoothest	connection	for	delivery	of	gas	to	and	from	
hubs	across	the	western	V4	border.	In	particular,	harmo-






pean	hubs.	This	activity	can	 start	 immediately	as	 it	does	
not	require	any	new	infrastructure.
ii.   Development of market zones. Existing	 entry-exit	market	
zones	 should	 be	 consolidated	 and	 remaining	 wholesale	
price	controls	gradually	phased	out.	The	market	zones	may	
include	 the	 Austrian/Czech/Slovak	 trading	 region	 pro-
posed	within	the	GRI-SSE,	using	the	large	existing	inter-
connection	 capacity	of	 the	 three	 countries.	However	 the	
adoption	of	this	solution	should	be	integrated	by	the	con-
nection	of	the	Hungarian	and	Polish	market	zones,	subject	




iii.  Connection of the V4 countries.	 Physical	 interconnection	
between	Hungary,	Slovakia	and	Poland	as	well	as	enhance-
ment	of	the	link	between	the	Czech	Republic	and	Poland	
should	proceed	 rapidly	 for	 the	 sake	 of	 credibility	 of	 any	




iv.   Joint implementation of the European Network Codes.	This	
would	 pave	 the	 way	 for	 harmonised	 market	 rules	 that	
would	be	the	basis	of	integration	as	a	single	market	zones	
or	as	a	trading	region.	Coordinated	work	by	V4	NRAs	and	
TSOs	would	also	 facilitate	 their	hard	 tasks	 in	 the	 imple-
mentation	of	ENCs,	 and	 improve	 regulatory	quality	 and	
stability.	
v.	 	 	 	In	particular	NRAs’ and TSOs’	cooperation	would	be	tar-
geted	at:
a. the establishment of a single entry-exit tariff zone;
b. Coordinated implementation of the Capacity 
Allocation Mechanism (CAM);
c. A coordinated capacity development mechanism, 
based on integrated auctions or open seasons, 
with contributions from public institutions; 
d. Harmonised balancing rules would be useful, 
although this would not necessarily mean the 
merging of the balancing zones, which should be 
decided at a later stage;
e. Common congestion management criteria, in line 
with the new Annex I of Regulation 715/2009/EC.
vi.	 	 V4	 countries	 should	 also	 work	 towards	 the	 adoption	 of	
common criteria for customer protection,	based	on	whole-
sale	 prices	 established	 in	 the	 V4	 market(s).	 It	 is	 worth	
recalling	 that	 the	 (even	 perceived)	 imposition	 of	 price	
freezes	 that	 may	 not	 cover	 costs	 is	 a	 major	 obstacle	 of	
market	liberalisation	and	integration	and	should	be	tem-
porary	and	related	to	objective	criteria.
vii. Implementation of a single market zone in the V4 region	
Standardised	capacity	products	 linking	 the	 zones	 should	
be	 developed	 building	 on	 the	 examples	 that	 are	 being	
developed	 (GATRAC,	 PRISMA,	Hungary-Romania	 etc.)	
and	 be	 subject	 to	 co-ordinated	 auctions.	 Other	 neigh-
bouring	 countries	 (Austria,	 Romania,	 Slovenia,	 Croatia,	
and	others)	may	be	invited	to	join	the	process.
viii. Decision on final market design. The	effort	to	carry	out	the	
previous	steps	will	probably	take	about	three	years.	Only	at	
that	point	and	in	relation	to	the	resulting	outcome	a	choice	
could	 be	made	 about	 the	 final	market	 design,	 choosing	
















However,	 the	 creation	 of	 new	 bodies	 should	 be	 minimised	
to	avoid	bureaucratisation.	The	GRI	SSE	may	offer	a	 suitable	
institutional	 framework	 for	 the	 regulatory	 harmonisation,	
provided	 it	 becomes	operational	 (following	 the	 electricity	RI	
example)	and	is	practically	articulated	into	smaller	sub-zones,	
among	 which	 one	 should	 be	 the	 V4.	 ENTSOG,	 ACER	 and	




Within	 such	 framework,	 committees	 for	 the	 streamlining	 of	
market	rules	and	the	implementation	of	network	codes	could	







opment	procedure,	which	may	be	 located	at	 regulatory	 level,	
would	probably	be	useful.
TSO	 coordination	 of	 transmission	 management	 activities,	
tariff	 revenue	calculation	and	 redistribution	would	be	neces-
sary	 and	 would	 represent	 a	major	 development,	 as	 it	 would	




body.	On	 the	other	hand,	 the	 evolution	of	 the	European	 gas	
transmission	 industry	 is	 probably	 heading	 towards	 broader	
collaboration	and	alliances,	even	though	this	does	not	neces-
sarily	require	full	mergers.
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